12. C. C. 1.
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A

SERMON

Preach'd at the

Morning-Exercise

AT

CRIPPLEGATE,

By the Most Reverend

Dr. *John Tillotson*,

Late Lord Archbishop of *Canterbury*.

Never yet publish'd among the rest of his Works.

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a. 3617.

LONDON,

Printed for *A. Baldwin* in *Warwick-Lane*.

M. DCC. IX.

Price 6 *d*.

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

To the Reader.

THE following Sermon, which was preach'd by the late Archbiſhop Tillotſon *about the Year* 1660. *before he conform'd to the Church of* England, *is now reprinted at the Deſire of ſeveral Gentlemen, who have a great Regard to the Memory of ſo great a Perſon; and are of too large a Spirit to think, that a Man may not write as good Senſe when a Diſſenter, as when a Churchman: who alſo judg, from the Importance of the Subject, that it ought to be reſcu'd from that Oblivion it lies under, while 'tis only in the Morning-Exerciſes; that ſo they who have his other Works may likewiſe furniſh themſelves with this, to bind up with 'em.*

To the Reader.

Mat. VII. 22.

Therefore all things whatſoever you would that Men ſhould do unto you, do ye even ſo to them; for this is the Law and the Prophets.

THESE Words being brought in by way of Inference from ſomething ſaid before, we muſt look back a little to find out the relation of them to the former Verſes. At the ſeventh Verſe Chriſt commands to ask of God thoſe things which we want; to encourage us to ask, he promiſes we ſhould receive; to induce us to believe this Promiſe, he puts a temporal caſe: Our earthly Fathers, who are evil, give us good things when we ask them, how much more eaſily may we be-

lieve this of a good God of infinite Goodneſs? Now as we deſire God ſhould give us thoſe things we ask, ſo we ſhould do to others; and not only ſo, but *univerſally in all other things, what we would that Men ſhould do to us, that we ſhould do to others. That Men ſhould do unto you*; tho the Perſons be expreſs'd, yet we may take it imperſonally, by an uſual *Hebraiſm*, as if it had been ſaid, *Whatever you would ſhould be done unto you*; leaving the Perſon to be ſupply'd in the largeſt ſenſe: thus, *Whatever you would ſhould be done unto you by God or Men. This is the Law and the Prophets*, i. e. This is the Sum of the Old Teſtament, ſo far as concerns our Duty to our Neighbour.

The Obſervation which ariſeth from the Words is this:

The great Rule of Equity in all our Dealings with Men is this, To do as we would be done unto. This Rule hath been otherwiſe expreſs'd, but not more emphatically in any other Form of Words than this here in the Text. Mat. 22. 39. *Love thy Neighbour as thy ſelf:* This requires that we ſhould bear the ſame Affection to our Neighbour, which we would have him bear to us; but the Rule in the Text expreſly requires that we ſhould do the ſame Offices to others, which we would have them do to us. *Severus* the Emperor (as the Hiſtorian *Lampridius* tells us) did learn this Rule of Chriſtians, and did much reverence Chriſt and Chriſtianity for it; but he expreſs'd it negatively, *Quod tibi non vis, alteri ne feceris:* Now this forbids

bids us to do Injurys to others, but doth not ſo expreſly command us to do Kindneſſes and Courteſys.

In ſpeaking to this Rule, I ſhall give you,

I. The *Explication* of it.
II. The *Grounds* of it.
III. The *Inſtances* wherein we ought principally to practiſe it.

I. For *Explication*, the meaning of it is this: Put thy ſelf into the Caſe and Circumſtances of every Man with whom thou haſt to do, that is, Suppoſe thou wert he and as he is, and he were thy ſelf and as thou art; that then which thou wouldſt deſire he ſhould do to thee, that do thou to him; and that which thou wouldſt be unwilling he ſhould do to thee, do not thou to him. Now this is an exact Rule; for we are very curious in determining our own Privileges, and what Duty others owe to us; juſt ſo much as we take to our ſelves, we muſt allow to others; what we expect from others when we are in ſuch Circumſtances, we muſt do the ſame to them in the like. And this is a plain and eaſy Rule. Many Men cannot tell what is Law, or Juſtice, or Right in ſuch a caſe; many cannot deduce the Laws of Nature one from another: but there is no Man but can tell what it is that he would have another Man do to him; every Man can take his own Actions, and put them into the other Scale, and ſuppoſe, If this that I do now to another were to be done to me, ſhould I like

it? Should I be pleas'd and contented with it? And thus by changing the Scale, his own Self-Love, and Self-Intereſt, and other Paſſions, will add nothing to the weight; for that Self-Intereſt which makes a Man covetous, and inclines him to wrong another Man for his own advantage, makes him likewiſe (when the Scales are chang'd) unwilling that another Man ſhould wrong him: that Self-Conceit which makes a Man proud, and apt to ſcorn and deſpiſe others, makes him unwilling that another ſhould contemn him.

I queſtion not but by this time you underſtand the meaning of the Rule; but we are not yet paſt all Difficultys about it: Three things are to be done, before this Rule will be of uſe to us.

1. We muſt make it appear, that it is *reaſonable*.

2. Make it *certain*, for till it be certain it cannot be a Rule.

3. Make it *practicable*.

1. We muſt make it appear to be *reaſonable*. The Difficulty about the Reaſonableneſs of it is this: According to this Rule I ſhall be oblig'd to do that many times which is ſinful, and to omit that which is a neceſſary Duty. I will give two or three Inſtances: *Saul* would have had his Armour-Bearer to have kill'd him; might he therefore have kill'd his Armour-Bearer if he had been willing, and had deſir'd it? I may not be an Inſtrument or Furtherer of another Man's Sin, tho I were ſo wicked as to deſire that another would be ſo to me.

If

If I were a Child, I would not have my Father correct me; or a Malefactor, I would not have the Magiſtrate cut me off: muſt there therefore be no Correction or Puniſhment? Now becauſe of theſe, and the like Inſtances which may be given, the Rule is neceſſarily to be underſtood of things that may be done or omitted, *i. e.* which are not unlawful or unreaſonable: *Saul* might not kill his Armour-Bearer; I may not further another Man's Sin, in the Caſes propounded, becauſe theſe things may not be done; they are morally impoſſible, that is, unlawful. A Parent or Magiſtrate may not wholly omit Correction or Puniſhment, becauſe ſuch Omiſſion would tend to the ruin of Good Manners and of Human Society.

2. We muſt make the Rule *certain*. The Difficulty about the Certainty of it, is this: Everlaſting Diſputes will ariſe about what is lawful and reaſonable, and unlawful and unreaſonable. Now we muſt reduce it to a Certainty thus: Whatever I would that another ſhould do to me, that I ſhould do to him, unleſs the thing be plainly and evidently unlawful or unreaſonable. And this cuts off all Diſputes: For tho there may be perpetual Diſputes about what is lawful and reaſonable, or the contrary, yet there can be no Diſpute about the Unlawfulneſs and Unreaſonableneſs of thoſe things which are plainly and evidently ſo; for that which is plain and evident, is out of all diſpute. To confirm this, let us conſider another Text, *Phil.* 4. 8. where the Apoſtle

Apoſtle exhorts Chriſtians to follow whatever things are *true*, and *honeſt*, and *juſt*, and *pure*; and as a diſcovery of what things are ſuch, he adds, whatever things are *lovely*, of *good report*, and *praiſe-worthy*; that is, whatever things are amiable, well ſpoken of, and prais'd by wiſe and good Men (who are the only competent Judges of theſe things) if they be not plainly contrary to Truth, or Honeſty, or Juſtice, or Purity, follow theſe things: and if this be not the meaning, thoſe words *lovely*, *of good report*, *praiſe-worthy*, are ſuperfluous, and do not at all direct our Converſation, which certainly the Apoſtle intended to do by them.

3. We muſt make it *practicable*. There are two things which make the Practice of it difficult.

1. A ſeeming *Contradiction* in the Rule.

2. *Partiality* in judging of the Circumſtances of other Mens Conditions and our own.

1. A ſeeming *Contradiction* in the Rule; which you will ſee in theſe Inſtances: If I deſire a thing, I would not have another ſtand in competition with me for it; If another deſire a thing, I would not have him think much that I ſtand in competition with him: If I be indebted to another, I would not have him arreſt me; If another be indebted to me, I would not have him think much that I arreſt him: When we ſell, we care not how dear; when we buy, we care not how cheap. Now if this were a real Contradiction in the

the Rule, it were impoſſible it ſhould be put in practice; but it is only a Contradiction in our *Wills*, which muſt thus be reconcil'd to the *Rule*.

(1.) We muſt conſider which of theſe Wills is moſt reaſonable, and the greater Reaſon and Equity muſt carry it; and that which is plainly unreaſonable, in compariſon of the other, is not to be regarded. If we conſider the two firſt Inſtances, this is moſt reaſonable, That where Men have an equal Right, they ſhould be allow'd an equal Liberty to uſe that Right; another Man hath as much Right to ſtand in competition with me for any thing, as I to ſtand in competition with him; and to arreſt me in caſe of Debt, as I to arreſt him: and it is plainly unreaſonable that I ſhould uſe this Right, and another be debar'd from it.

(2.) If both theſe contradictory Wills be plainly unreaſonable, as in the third Inſtance of buying and ſelling, they muſt be accommodated by finding out ſuch a Medium as is equally and mutually good for all Buyers and Sellers; that is, ſuch a Proportion of Gain may be taken, and muſt be allow'd to be taken, as will be equally and mutually good for all Buyers and Sellers.

2. Another Difficulty in the Practice of this Rule ariſeth from Mens *Partiality* in judging of the Circumſtances of other Mens Conditions and their own. We are apt to leſſen the Circumſtances of another Man's Condition, and to over-value our own;

another Man's Concernments ſeem leſs to us than they are, and our own greater than they are. Now this difficulty will moſt eminently appear in *Caſes of Paſſion and Intereſt*, and thoſe *ſubordinate Relations* which are at the greateſt diſtance: Another Man provokes me, I revenge my ſelf on him; one asks me, *Would you be contented to be thus dealt withal?* I am ready to anſwer, *Yea, if I ſhould ſo provoke another*; I aggravate the fault of his Provocation, and leſſen that of my own Revenge: here is *Paſſion*. I deſire a Courteſy of a Man which he cannot conveniently do for me, he denys me; I think much at him, becauſe I judg the *Courteſy leſs*, and *his Obligation* to do it *greater* than indeed it is: here is *Intereſt*. I think, if I were a Father, I ſhould not carry my ſelf ſo ſeverely towards my Children; if I were a Maſter, I ſhould give more Liberty to Servants, and uſe them with a greater Familiarity; if I were a Miniſter, I ſhould not gall the Conſciences of People by ſo free and open a Reproof of Sin; if I were a Magiſtrate, I ſhould make other Laws, or puniſh ſome Crimes more or leſs ſeverely. Now if Men frequently thus miſ-judg, how ſhall this Rule be put in Practice?

To remove theſe Difficultys, as much as may be, and to make the Practice of this Rule more eaſy; obſerve theſe Rules.

1. Labour to underſtand truly every Man's Condition, ſo far as you have opportunity: This is eaſily ſaid, but how ſhall

ſhall we come to do it? Thus, when you are in any Condition, obſerve diligently the Motions of your own Mind, and how your Affections then work, and what Apprehenſions you then have of things, and what it is that in ſuch a condition you deſire and expect from others; and labour to remember this when you are out of that condition, and to retain the ſenſe which you then had of things.

2. In caſes wherein you are unexperienc'd, and which you cannot reaſonably be preſum'd to underſtand, partly becauſe of your diſtance from that Condition, partly becauſe of the oppoſition of your own Intereſt, and partly becauſe of the Miſts and Clouds of your own Paſſion; truſt the concurrent Experience of others who are in that condition, and think that you ought not to do that to another which the generality of Mankind count grievous; and that fit to be done, which the moſt and wiſeſt in ſuch a Condition and Relation, do uſually expect. If Men, when they are under, and lie at the mercy of others, generally deſire that Clemency and Moderation ſhould be us'd towards them, how juſt ſoever thou mayſt think thy Severity is, and that thou wouldſt be contented that another ſhould deal ſo with thee; yet do not truſt thy preſent Apprehenſions of things, but believe that thou wilt have the ſame ſenſe of things, when they lie heavy upon thee, with the reſt of Mankind; and when thou art in their Circumſtances, thou wilt deſire quarter as they

they do. In like manner, that Reſpect and Obedience which Parents, and Maſters, and Magiſtrates do generally expect (even the beſt and wiſeſt of them) that do thou pay to them; and tho it may have ſome appearance of Rigour and Injuſtice, yet believe that when thou comeſt to be in the ſame relation, thou wilt expect the ſame things as they do; and that thou doſt now judg otherwiſe, proceeds from thy Inexperience or Diſtance from that Condition, or from Paſſion and Oppoſition of Intereſt.

3. Conclude that in caſes betwixt Superiors and Inferiors, the Partiality is uſually on the Inferior's ſide; and it is reaſonable thus to conclude, both becauſe Inferiors have ſeldom had experience of the other Condition, as Superiors uſually have had; (A Child hath not been a Parent, or a Servant ordinarily a Maſter, or a Subject a Magiſtrate; but all Parents have been Children, and moſt Maſters have been Servants, and many Magiſtrates Subjects, and ſo they have had experience of both Conditions) and likewiſe becauſe Inferiors cannot ſo well ſee the Condition and Circumſtances of thoſe that are above them, as thoſe that are above can of thoſe that are below them; they have the advantage of Ground, and better Opportunitys of Knowledg.

4. In judging of your preſent Condition and Circumſtances, always abate ſomething for the Preſence of them, and for Self-Love, and Self-Intereſt, and other Paſſions.

Passions. He that doth not consider how apt every Man is unequally to favour himself, doth not know the Littleness and Narrowness of Human Nature. We are near to our selves, and our own Interest is near to us, and we see it in its full Proportions, and with all possible Advantages; other Men and their Interests are at a distance from us, and seem less to us than they are. Now we must make Abatements for this, according to that experience which we have had of our own Mistakes; which, if we will observe as we pass from one Condition into another, we may easily be convinc'd how great many times they are.

II. For the *Grounds* of this: The Equity of this Rule stands upon these Foundations.

1. All Men are equal in many things, and those the greatest things. Now I should deal equally with him whom I acknowledg to be mine Equal. *Have we not all one Father? Hath not one God created us?* Mal. 2. 10. Are we not all made of the same Materials? *Is it not appointed for all Men once to die?* Heb. 9. 27. and after Death to stand before the impartial Judgment of God? We have all the same Notions of Right and Wrong; we are all obnoxious to one another, and may be all beneficial one to another; we all love our selves, and study the Advancement of our Interest and Happiness. Thus far equal.

2. In

2. In moſt of thoſe things wherein we are unequal, the Inequality is not conſiderable, ſo as to be a ground of any unequal Dealing with one another. As to *Strength of Body*, whatever the difference be, the Inequality is not conſiderable, becauſe as to the greateſt Effects of Strength there is an Equality: Every Man that will venture his own * Life, may take away another Man's, either by open force or by ſurprize. As to *Abilitys of Mind* (which we uſually call *Parts*) there is originally a great Equality, eſpecially if that receiv'd Opinion be true, that *Souls are equal*. And as the *French* Philoſopher *Des Cartes* has ingeniouſly † obſerv'd, there is this notable ſign of the Equality of Mens Underſtandings; *Nulla res* (ſaith he) *æquabilius inter homines diſtributa eſt quam bona mens*, &c. *Nothing is more equally divided amongſt Men, than a good Underſtanding. Men will acknowledg others to be richer and ſtronger than themſelves; few will acknowledg others to be wiſer, or to have better Parts than themſelves: Every Man thinks himſelf to have ſo good a proportion of Parts and* || *Wiſdom, that even thoſe who are moſt covetous, and have the moſt inſatiable Deſires as to other things, and whom Nature could never ſatisfy in any thing elſe, yet would not deſire to have more Wit than they have, or exchange their Parts with any Man.*

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* *Dominus eſt alterius vitæ quicunq; contemnit ſuam.*
† *Diſſertat. de Methodo.*
|| *Qui velit ingenio cedere rarus eſt.*

Now

Now there is no better ſign of an equal Diſtribution of things, than that every Man is contented with his Share. *Now becauſe all Men generally think thus, it is to be preſum'd that all are not deceiv'd; but that there is ſome real Equality, which is the Ground of this Conceit.* A difference indeed muſt be granted, but which ariſeth uſually from one of theſe two Caſes, either *an unequal Exerciſe of our Parts*, or *an unequal Temper of Body*. Now thoſe who are ſo happy as to exerciſe their Underſtandings more than others, are very often rather conceited that they are wiſer than others, than really ſo; *for the greateſt Clerks are not always the wiſeſt Men.* Thoſe who are unhappy in the Temper of their Bodys, are thereby inclin'd, how weak ſoever they be, to conceit themſelves as wiſe as others. So that whatever real Inequality there be, Conceit levels all again. So that whether Men be really wiſe, or only think themſelves ſo, it makes no difference as to Mens dealing one with another; for they that think themſelves equal, will not deal but upon equal Terms. So that * *Ariſtotle*'s pretty Notion, That *Wiſe Men are born to govern, and Fools to obey*, ſignifys very little in this Caſe; for there are but few ſuch Fools in the World, but would govern if they can. So that by virtue of Wiſdom or Parts, no Man can challenge a Privilege or Prerogative to himſelf above others, which another will not pretend to as well as he.

* *Politic. c.* 3.

3. In all thoſe things wherein Men are unequal, the Inequality is not fix'd and conſtant, but mutable and by turns. All things that belong to us, are either the *Endowments of the Mind*, the *Accidents of the Body*, or the *Circumſtances of our outward Eſtate*. Now thoſe that are moſt unequal in any of theſe, may be equal; for the Inequality may turn, and be as much on the other ſide. A Diſeaſe may ruin the moſt happy and excellent Memory, and make a Man forget his own Name; a little knock on any ſide of the Head may level the higheſt Underſtanding with the meaneſt; *Beauty*, *Health*, and *Strength* may be blaſted by a Diſeaſe, or a thouſand other Accidents; *Riches*, and *Honour*, and *Reputation*, are the moſt ſlippery and brittle things that belong to us; and when theſe are gone, *Friends* will fall off like Leaves in Autumn. Now why ſhould I deſpiſe another Man, when I may be as ſilly as he; or bear down another by my Strength, when I may be as weak as he; or inſult over another's poor and low Condition, when a Day may level me with his Meanneſs, and raiſe him to be as great and rich as I am?

4. Another Ground is, *The mutual and univerſal Equity and Advantage of this Rule*. Upon thoſe terms I and all Men ſhall be equally dealt with; it will be well with me, and well with all Men. The Obſervation of this Rule would ſecure Peace to the World: and if it were generally practis'd, thoſe few that ſhould offend againſt it,

it, would be look'd upon as the Pests and Troublers of Human Society. As by the Violation of this Rule every Man becomes a *Wolf* and *Beast of Prey* to another, so by the Observation of it every Man would be a *God* to another; Men would be full of mutual Goodness, and Pity, and Compassion; they would be mutual Benefactors one to another. All Men would be as happy as it is possible for them to be in this World, and no Man could be miserable if it were in the power of his Neighbour to help him.

5. The last Ground I shall mention is, *The Absurdity and Inconvenience of the contrary.*

And this is the most proper way of proving this; for, as *Aristotle* tells us, *First Principles, which are evident by their own Light, cannot be prov'd by way of Demonstration, but of Conviction:* As thus, *Contradictions cannot be true at once*; this cannot be demonstrated *a priori*, because there is nothing true before it, to prove it by; therefore whoever shall deny it, must be convinc'd of the Truth of it, by shewing the Absurditys of the contrary. In like manner this being one of the first Principles of Human Society, That we should use no more liberty towards other Men, than we would allow them to use towards us; the best way to convince any Man of the Reasonableness and Equity of it, will be to shew him the Inconveniences of the contrary. Wherever this Principle is violated, Men will think themselves

injur'd; where Men are injur'd, they will be apt to vindicate themſelves: Hence come Contention and Wars, which looſe the Bands of Human Society; or if a Man can pardon an Injury that hath receiv'd one, yet he that hath done it cannot believe ſo, but he will fear Revenge; and Fear of being oppreſt, makes a Man ſeek to anticipate and prevent another: ſo that every Injury endangers the Peace and Security of Mankind, and lays the foundation of perpetual Miſchief; for by the ſame reaſon that I injure any Man, I am oblig'd to ruin him.

He that breaks this Rule, doth what he can to break Human Society; that is, to ſpoil himſelf of all common Protection, and to leave himſelf to ſtand upon his guard againſt all the World; in which ſtate no Man can hope to continue, that is not wiſer and ſtronger than all the World. *Ariſtotle* tells us *, *He that deſires to be alone, muſt either be a God or a wild Beaſt*; that is, he muſt either be ſelf-ſufficient, and ſtand in need of nothing; or elſe be wild and ſavage, and delight in Cruelty and Miſchief.

III. The *Inſtances* wherein we ought chiefly to practiſe this Rule, are theſe:

1. In matters of *Civil Reſpect and Converſation*, I muſt treat every Man with that fair Reſpect I would have another to ſhew me. We muſt accommodate our

* Ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν, ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν, οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός. *Pol. c. 2.*

ſelves

ſelves to Mens particular Tempers, and not be froward or intractable, or tenacious of our own Humour, eſpecially when it lies in another man's way; but we muſt be apt to recede and give way, that there may be room for other mens Tempers and Humours, as well as ours; our Humour muſt not take up all the world. Thoſe who want this Complaiſance, are in Society (as one ingeniouſly compares them) like irregular Stones in a Building, which are full of Roughneſs and Corners; they take up more room than they fill; till they be poliſh'd and made even, others cannot lie near them: ſo Men of ſharp and perverſe Humours are unſociable, till the Ruggedneſs and Aſperitys of their Nature be taken off. We muſt not carry our ſelves inſolently or ſuperciliouſly, or contemptuouſly towards others; we muſt not be contumelious; nor by Deed or Word, Countenance or Geſture, declare Hatred or Contempt of others. We muſt not upbraid one another with any Imperfection, or Weakneſs, or Deformity; we muſt not peremptorily contradict others, we muſt not uſe to talk things diſpleaſing to others, wherein their Credit or Relations, or (eſpecially) their Religion is concern'd. *Joſephus* ſaith *, this was one of *Moſes*'s Laws (it was a good one whoſeever it was) ὃς ἄλλαι πόλεις νομίζουσι θεὸς μηδεὶς βλασφημείτω; *Let no Man blaſpheme that which other Nations count a God*, or make their

* *Antiquit. Judaic. lib.* 4.

Religion. Not but that every Man may confute a falſe Religion, and endeavour by all fair ways to convince a Jew, a Turk, or Heathen; but we may not reproach another man's Religion, or provoke any Man in ordinary Converſation by unſeaſonable and uncivil Reflections upon it: for we are with meekneſs to convince Gainſayers, to reprove Men for their Sins, but not to upbraid them with them. We muſt give no offence to the Jew, or to the Gentile, remembring always that the Wrath of Man doth not work the Righteouſneſs of God; and that *Michael* the Arch-Angel, when he contended with the Devil, did not bring a railing Accuſation againſt him; he did not revile him, no, not in the heat of diſpute. And there is great reaſon why we ſhould thus carry our ſelves towards others, becauſe we our ſelves would not be contemn'd or deſpis'd; we would not have any man jeer us, or inſult over us, or upbraid us, or peeviſhly contradict us, or affront us by ſpeaking unhandſomly of us, or of our Relations, or our Religion. Now if we would have others to conſider us, we muſt not neglect them; if we would be taken notice of for ſome body, we muſt not overlook others with contempt. Every thing thinks it ſelf conſiderable; and there is nothing comes ſooner to us, or continues longer with us, than a Senſe of our own Worth; and we judg ill of Human Nature, if we think another Man is not as impatient of rude and uncivil Uſage as we are: Nothing

thing would be deſpis'd, a Worm would not be trod upon; nay, Men do uſually over-value themſelves, and are apt to think that they are Owners of that ſingular Worth, which may command Reſpect from all Men; and that every one that paſſeth by ought to fall down, and do obeyſance to them: they have *Joſeph*'s Dream waking, they think *all Mens Sheaves bow to their Sheaves*; they think every Man takes notice of them, and obſerves their Carriage and Actions, when probably not one of a thouſand ever took them into conſideration, or ask'd who they were. Now we muſt conſider, that it is a hundred to one but there is a little of this Vanity in us alſo, and that we do uſually look for more Reſpect than is due; therefore it will not be amiſs, in our Reſpects towards others, *largiri aliquid*, to give Men ſomething above what we think they deſerve; and the rather, becauſe civil Reſpect is cheap, and coſts us nothing, and we expect from others full as much as comes to our ſhare; for it is a miſtake to think that we do but righteouſly eſteem our ſelves, and that we have no more than a juſt Value of our own Worth.

2. In Matters of *Kindneſs* and *Courteſy*, we muſt be uſeful to one another. I would have no Man churliſh to me, but ready to gratify me, and do me a Kindneſs. Do I think much to be deny'd a reaſonable Favour, and doth not another ſo too? We would have all Men love us, that is, bear ſuch an Affection to us, that when it falls

in their way, they ſhould be ready to do us a Courteſy. We would not have Courteſys done in a diſcourteous manner, extorted by Importunity, or upbraided to us afterwards. Let us likewiſe diſpenſe Favours with a liberal Hand and a chearful Countenance, that Men may ſee that they come from a kind Heart, and a real Good-will.

3. In Matters of *Charity* and *Compaſſion*: If any Man be in Miſery, pity him, and help him to your power; if any be in Neceſſity and Want, contribute to his Relief, without too ſcrupulous Inquirys about him; for we would be thus dealt with our ſelves, we would not have others to harden their Hearts, or ſhut up their Bowels of Compaſſion againſt us. Is any Man caſt down? do not inſult over him, and trample upon him; do not look upon him with Scorn, and rejoice over him in the day of Diſtreſs. *Res eſt ſacra miſer*; *Perſons in Miſery are ſacred, and not to be violated.* When you ſee any Man in Calamity, think ye hear him ſay to you with Job, *I alſo could ſpeak as you do, if your Soul were in my Soul's ſtead: I could heap up Words againſt you, and ſhake mine head at you; but I would ſtrengthen you with my Mouth, and the moving of my Lips ſhould aſſuage your Grief*, Job 16. 4, 5.

4. In Matters of *Forbearance* and *Forgiveneſs*. We ſtand in need of Forbearance and Pardon from others, from God and Men; we ſhould be loth God ſhould take advantage againſt us upon every Provocation,

cation, and let fly at us with a Thunderbolt every time we offend him. We would not have Men ſtorm and fall into Paſſion with us upon every ſlight occaſion: I would have great Allowances given to me; I would have my *Ignorance*, and *Inadvertency*, and *Miſtakes*, and *preſent Temper*, and all *Occaſions* and *Provocations*, and every thing conſider'd. And when I have done amiſs, upon acknowledgment of my Fault, I would be forgiven and receiv'd to Favour. Now if we would be thus dealt with, we muſt bear with others; the beſt Men need ſome Grains of Allowance, *Nullum unquam ingenium placuit ſine venia*; no Man was ever ſo perfect, ſo accompliſh'd, ſo unexceptionable, but there was ſomething or other in his Carriage that needed Pardon. Every Man hath a particular Humour, we muſt give ſome allowance for that; every Man is ſubject to Miſtake, we muſt allow for that too: and if a Man have committed a Fault, we muſt accept of an ingenuous Acknowledgment, and be ready to grant him Peace. There is a Shame and Diſdain in Human Nature of too vile a Submiſſion, therefore we muſt not bring a Man too low when we have him at advantage.

5. In Matter of *Report*, and *Repreſentation* of other *Men* and their *Actions*. We muſt not take up a raſh Prejudice, or entertain a ſiniſter Apprehenſion of any upon ſlight Grounds. Do not repreſent any Man, his Words or Actions, at a diſadvantage; make the beſt of every thing. A Man's

Man's good Name is like a Looking-Glaſs, nothing is ſooner crack'd, and every Breath can ſully it. Handle every Man's Reputation with the ſame tenderneſs thou wouldſt have every Man uſe towards thine. Do not ſlander or defame any Man, or rejoice to hear other Mens Miſcarriages ript open; do not account it an Entertainment to cenſure and backbite all the World.

6. In Matters of *Truſt* and *Fidelity*. Where I place a Confidence, and repoſe a Truſt, I would not be deceiv'd; I muſt not deceive another, nor let any Man fall that leans upon me. If a Man truſt me with the Management of his Buſineſs, or lodg a Secret with me, or put his Life into my power, or commit the Care of his Eſtate or Children to me after his Death; theſe are ingenuous Truſts, and muſt be diſcharg'd with the ſame Faithfulneſs we expect from others.

7. In Matter of *Duty* and *Obedience*. We muſt give that Honour to our Parents, which we would expect from our Children; and pay that Reverence to Maſters, which we would exact from our Servants. We muſt riſe up before the grey Head, and give Reſpect to Old Age; for let us not think, but that the Change of Relation and of Age, will have the ſame effect upon us which it hath upon the reſt of the World. It is a folly to talk, that when we are Old we ſhall be pleas'd with the Inſolencys of Youth; when we are Maſters, we ſhall not be at all offended with the contemptuous Carriage of our Servants;

vants; that it will not touch our Hearts to have our Children undutiful and void of Reſpect, to ſee the Fruit of our Body unnatural and unkind to us.

8. In Matters of *Freedom* and *Liberty*, which are not determin'd by any natural or poſitive Law. We muſt permit as much to others as we aſſume to our ſelves; and this is a ſign of an equal and temperate Perſon, and one that juſtly values his own Underſtanding and Power. But there is nothing wherein Men uſually deal more unequally with one another, than in indifferent Opinions and Practices of Religion. I account that an indifferent Opinion which good Men differ about; not that ſuch an Opinion is indifferent as to Truth or Error, but as to Salvation or Damnation it is not of neceſſary Belief. By an indifferent Practice in Religion, I mean that which is in its own nature neither a Duty, nor a Sin to do or omit. Where I am left free, I would not have any Man to rob me of my Liberty, or intrench upon my Freedom; and becauſe he is ſatisfy'd ſuch a thing is lawful and fit to be done, expect I ſhould do it, who think it otherwiſe; or becauſe he is confident ſuch an Opinion is true, be angry with me becauſe I cannot believe as faſt as he. Now if another do ill in doing thus to me, I cannot do well in doing ſo to another. And do not ſay that thou art ſure thou art in the right, and he that differs from thee in the wrong; and therefore thou mayſt impoſe upon him, tho he may

may not upon thee. Hath not every man this Confidence of his own Opinion and Practice? and uſually the weakeſt Cauſe bears up with the greateſt Confidence. Now if thou wouldſt not have another, who is confident he is in the right, impoſe upon thee, do not thou impoſe upon another for all thy Confidence. We ſhould rather be modeſt, and ſay every one to our ſelves, *How came I to be ſo much wiſer than other Men? Which way came the Spirit of the Lord from ſo many wiſe and pious Men, to ſpeak unto me? Is it a peculiar Privilege granted to me, that I cannot be miſtaken? Or are not they moſt of all miſtaken, who think they cannot miſtake? If then I be but like other Men, why ſhould I take ſo much upon me, as if my Underſtanding were to be a Rule, and my Apprehenſions a Standard to the whole World? As if when another Man differs from me, I did not differ as much from him. Why may not another Man underſtand the thing better than I do, or what Crime is it if he underſtand it not ſo well? Were all Mens Underſtandings caſt in the ſame Mould? Is it Preſumption for any Man to know more than I do, or a Sin to know leſs?* *Job* doth well reprove this Self-Conceit, *Job* 12. 2, 3. His Friends would needs bear him down, and were very angry with him that he was not of their mind, and would not acknowledg all to be true of himſelf which they ſaid againſt him. He takes them up ſharply: *No doubt ye are the People, and Wiſdom ſhall die with you; but I have Underſtanding as well as you, and I am not inferiour to you:*

Who

Who knoweth not ſuch things as theſe? Let not any Man think that he hath ingroſs'd all the Knowledg of the World to himſelf, but others know the ſame things which he doth, and many things better than he.

9. In Matters of *Commerce*, and *Contracts* which ariſe from thence. Now a Contract is a mutual transferring of Right. When I buy any thing of another, he makes over the Right of ſuch a Commodity to me for ſo much Mony, or other valuable thing, the Right whereof I make over to him. Now in this kind of Intercourſe, we are to be govern'd by this great Rule. In making of Contracts we muſt *agere bona fide*, deal honeſtly and truly: in performing of Contracts we muſt *liberare fidem*, ſatisfy the Ingagement we have made, for thus we our ſelves would be dealt withal.

Now if any ſhall deſire to be more particularly ſatisfy'd, *What that exact Righteouſneſs is which in Matter of Contracts ought to be obſerv'd betwixt Man and Man*; I muſt confeſs this is a difficult Queſtion, and to be handled very modeſtly by ſuch as acknowledg themſelves unacquainted with the Affairs of the World, and the Neceſſitys of Things, and the particular and hidden Reaſons of ſome kind of Dealings; for he who is ignorant of theſe, may eaſily give Rules which will not comply with the Affairs of the World. He may complain of that which cannot be otherwiſe, and blame ſome kind of Dealings which are juſtifiable from particular Reaſons, not obvious to any Man who is unſeen in the way of

of Trade. Beſides, there are many Caſes fall under this Queſtion which are very nice, but of great conſequence; and the greater Caution and Tenderneſs ought to be us'd in the Reſolution of them, becauſe they are Matters of conſtant Practice, and the greateſt part of Mankind are concern'd in them.

Now it is a dangerous thing to miſtake in thoſe things in which many Perſons are intereſted, eſpecially if they be things of ſuch a vaſt difference, as Good and Evil, Right and Wrong are: For if that be determin'd to be lawful, which is unlawful, Men are led into Sin; if that be determin'd to be unlawful, which is lawful, Men are led into a Snare: for if this Determination be to the prejudice of Men in their Callings, it is an hundred to one but common Example and private Intereſt will make many continue in that Practice; and then the miſchief is this, Tho Men do that which is lawful and right, yet they are ſtagger'd by the Authority and Confidence of him, who hath determin'd it unlawful, and ſo have ſome reluctancy in their Conſciences in the doing of it, and this by accident becomes a great Sin to them. And when upon a ſick Bed, or any other occaſion, they come to be touch'd with the Senſe of Sin, this will be matter of greater Horrour and Affrightment to them than a real Sin which they committed ignorantly, and were afterwards convinc'd of. Upon all theſe Conſiderations, I ought to proceed with great warineſs in the anſwering of this Queſtion; therefore I ſhall content

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my self with speaking those things which are clear and evident, tho they be but general, rather than venture out of my Depth, by descending into Particulars, and such things as are out of my notice.

I shall therefore,

1. Lay down the General Rule.

2. Some Propositions which may tend to the Explication of it.

3. Some special Rules for the directing of our Commerce and Intercourse.

1. The General Rule is this, *That which it is not unreasonable for me to desire to gain by another when I am to sell, that I should allow another to gain by me when I am to buy; and that which is not unreasonable another should gain by me when I am to buy, that and no more I may gain by another when I am to sell.*

2. The Propositions which I shall lay down for the further Explication of this Rule, are these:

(1.) *In Buying and Selling, such a Proportion of Gain may be taken, and ought to be allow'd, as is mutually and universally best.* And this every Man is presum'd to desire, because this will be certainly good for every one: whereas if it be not universally good, it may be bad for any one; if it be not mutually so, it will be bad for me by turns.

(2.) *That Proportion of Gain which allows a reasonable Compensation for our Time, and Pains and Hazard, is universally and mutually best.* If the Compensation be unreasonably great, it will be bad for the Buyer; if unreasonably little, it will be bad for the Seller; if equal and reasonable, it will be good for all.

(3.) *That*

(3.) *That Proportion of Gain, which in common Intercourſe and Uſe of Bargaining among thoſe who underſtand what they buy and ſell, is generally allow'd, ought to be eſteem'd a reaſonable Compenſation.* This is evident, becauſe the common Reaſon of Mankind doth beſt determine what is reaſonable; therefore thoſe who ſpeak of commutative Juſtice, and place it in the Equality of things contracted for, need explaining; for Value is not a thing abſolute and certain, but relative and mutable. Now to fix the Value of things as much as may be, this Rule is commonly given, *Tanti unumquodque valet, quanti vendi poteſt*; *Every thing is worth ſo much as it may be ſold for:* which muſt not be underſtood too particularly, as if the preſent and particular Appetite of the Contractor were to be the Rule; for every thing is not worth ſo much as any body will give for it, but ſo much as in common Intercourſe among knowing Perſons it will give. For this I take for a Truth, that in the ordinary Plenty of Commoditys, there is an ordinary and uſual Price of them known to the underſtanding Perſons of every Profeſſion: If I be out in this, the matter of Gain will be more uncertain than I thought of.

(4.) *A reaſonable Compenſation doth not conſiſt in an indiviſible Point, but hath a certain Latitude, which likewiſe is to be determin'd by the common Intercourſe and Practice of Men.* Suppoſe ten in the hundred be the uſual Gain made of ſuch a Commodity, eleven the higheſt, nine the loweſt; the

Latitud

Latitude is betwixt nine and eleven.

(5.) *Every Man ingag'd in a way of Commerce, is presum'd to understand, unless the contrary be evident.* So that, keeping within the Latitude of a lawful Gain, I may use my Skill against another Man in driving a Bargain; but if his Want of Skill be evident, that is sufficiently known to me, I must use him as I would do a Child, or other unskilful Person, that is, fairly.

(6.) *Where the Price of Things alters* (as it often doth almost in all things) *no other Rule can be given but the common and market Price.* There are some things which are fixedly certain, as Coin, there I have no Latitude at all; I may not put off a Piece of Mony for more than its Value, tho a Person out of Ignorance would take it for more. There are some Commoditys which in ordinary Plenty, being of ordinary goodness, have an usual Price; here I have but little Latitude, *viz.* that of the Market. In the rising and falling of Commoditys I have greater Latitude, but usually in these Cases the Market sets some kind of Price, unless I be the sole Master of a Commodity; and here the Latitude is the greatest, and my own Reason and Moderation must limit me. And if any ask why I make the Market the Rule, seeing this seems to be as if I should say, Let every Man get as much as he can, for so Men in the Market do: I answer, The Market is usually more reasonable than the particular Appetites of Men; and tho every Man be apt to get as much as he can, yet Men generally have

an Appetite to ſell, as well as to ſell dear, and that checks this; and Men are brought to Moderation, becauſe they are unwilling to loſe Cuſtom: ſo that he who governs himſelf by the Market-Prices, not catching at particular Advantages, ſeems to me to follow the ſafeſt Rule.

(7.) *There are ſome things allow'd in common Intercourſe, which are ſo rigorous, that they are hardly juſt*; which are rather tolerable than commendable. I will give one Inſtance inſtead of many: A Man hath a ſmall Piece of Ground lying within another Man's Eſtate, he is willing to ſell, but requires (poſſibly) forty or ſixty Years Purchaſe, or more, according to the particular Appetite of the Purchaſer. This ſeems not to be ſo agreable to this great Rule of Equity; I doubt not but ſome advantage may be made in this Caſe, and I will not ſet any peremptory Limits: I ſhall only ſay this in general, we ſhould ſet a moderate Value upon another Man's Appetite and Convenience.

(8.) *It is to be fear'd, that ſomething very like Unrighteouſneſs is woven into the Myſterys of moſt Trades*; and like *Phidias*'s Image in *Minerva*'s Shield, cannot be defac'd without the Ruin of it. I think this is not a groundleſs Jealouſy, but the Confeſſion and Complaint of the moſt knowing and underſtanding Perſons in moſt human Affairs: I ſhall inſtance only in the ſlightneſs of Work, the imbaſing of Commoditys, and ſetting them off by indirect Advantages. I can only bewail this; for unleſs the World could

could generally be convinc'd of this, it is not like to be amended. Perfection is not to be look'd for in this imperfect State; we must be content if things are passable.

(9.) *Nevertheless we ought to aspire after as great a degree of Righteousness and Equity, as the Condition of human Affairs will admit.* We should bend all our Endeavours to the bettering of the World, and not only avoid all Unrighteousness, but draw back as much as in us lies, from the indirect Practices of the World, and from all Appearance of Unrighteousness.

3. The more particular Rules are these:

(1.) *Impose upon no Man's Ignorance or Unskilfulness.* Thou mayst set a just Value upon thine own Commodity, but not a Price upon another Man's Head. I mean, thou mayst not rate a Man's Want of Understanding, or set a Tax upon his Ignorance: therefore take no advantage of Children, or any other incompetent Persons; and do not only use them with Justice, but with Ingenuity, as those that repose a Trust in you, and cast themselves upon your Equity. And here are some Questions to be resolv'd.

Quest. 1. *If a Man be otherwise skilful in his Calling, May not I take advantage of his Ignorance of a particular Circumstance wherein the Contract is concern'd?*

Answ. I will tell you how *Tully* resolves this in a particular Case: "A Man, says "he, brings a Ship of Corn from *Alexandria* to *Rhodes*, in a time of great Famine; he may have what Price he will, "he

De Offic. l. 3.

" he knows of a great many more Ships " that will be there next day; may he con- " ceal this from the *Rhodians*? He deter- termines peremptorily he may not. If we will be worse than Heathens——I say no more.

Quest. 2. *But may we not take advantage of the Ignorance of the Seller, tho not of the Buyer?* The difference is, he that offers to sell any thing at such a Price, is willing so to part with it; now there is no wrong done to him that is willing.

I answer, *A Man is so far willing, as he is knowing. Aristotle* tells us, *That Ignorance is a sort of Unwillingness.* If a Man out of forgetfulness, or want of consideration, or sufficient understanding his own Calling, mistake himself, I may not make a Prize of this Man's Weakness: for he is only willing to sell it so upon supposition he remembers right, and understands himself aright; but the thing being really worth more, he is absolutely unwilling, and I am injurious to him in taking advantage.

Quest. 3. *May I not sell secret Faults and Vices in a Commodity?*

Answ. If the Faults be such as Men take for granted do often happen, and notwithstanding them they do not account any Man to have deceiv'd them, then they are Faults pardon'd by common Consent; but if they be such as I am griev'd at, and think my self not fairly dealt withal when they happen, then some think it is enough to allow for them in the Price. But I think *Tully* hath determin'd it better: *Ne*

quid

quid omnino quod venditor novit emptor ignoret; *That the Buyer ſhould not be left ignorant of any thing that the Seller knows.* And this ſeems reaſonable, for I know not but another Man may value thoſe Faults higher than I do; however it is not ſo fair for me to make another Man's Bargain. De Offic. l. 3.

(2.) *Impoſe upon no Man's Neceſſity.* If a Man muſt needs buy now, or of thee, becauſe none elſe is near, make no advantage of this.

(3.) *When God's Providence hath put into thy hands ſome great Opportunity and Advantage* (as by the intervention of ſome unexpected Law, by a ſudden War or Peace betwixt Nations, or by ſome other Caſualty) *do not ſtretch it to the utmoſt. Fortunam reverenter habe, Uſe this providential Advantage modeſtly*; conſidering that he whoſe Bleſſing gave thee this Opportunity, can blaſt thee a thouſand ways.

(4.) *Uſe Plainneſs in all your Dealings.* This the *Roman* Laws call'd, *Bona fide agere.* Do not diſparage another Man's Commodity, or raiſe your own beſides Truth, this is ſinful: Do not inſinuate a Commendation or Diſparagement indirectly, thereby to lead a Man into an Error, that you may draw on a Bargain the more eaſily: Do not (as your Phraſe is) ask or bid much out of the way; for if this be not ſimply unlawful, yet it doth not become an honeſt Man. We commend the Quakers becauſe they are at a word in all their Dealings; we would be loth not to be counted as good Chriſtians as they are. Let us then do as good

things as they do, especially when we account those things praise-worthy; and I am sure this is no ways contrary to Justice, and Honesty, and Truth. I know nothing that gives so real a Reputation to that Sect as this Practice: and would it not adorn those who account themselves the more sober Christians? If we praise this in others, let us practise it in our selves. We are apt to value our selves much by our Orthodox Judgments; but let us take heed that Sectarys do not confute us by their Orthodox Lives. For the sake of Religion, next to your Consciences, in all your Dealings tender your Reputation: for *quod Conscientia est apud Deum, id Fama est apud homines*; *That which Conscience is in reference to God, that our Reputation is in respect of Men.*

(5.) *In Matters of Vanity and Fancy, and things which have no certain Estimation, use Moderation*; and so much the rather, because in these thou art left to be thy own Judg.

(6.) *Do not go to the utmost of things lawful.* He that will always walk upon the brink, is in great danger of falling down: He that will do the utmost of what he may, will sometime or other be tempted to what he should not; for it is a short and easy passage from the utmost limits of what is lawful, to what is evil and unlawful: therefore in that latitude which you have of Gain, use Favour towards the Poor and Necessitous, Ingenuity towards the Ignorant and Unskilful, and Moderation towards all Men.

(7.) *Where*

(7.) *Where you have any doubt about the Equity of Dealings, chuſe you the ſafeſt part, and that which will certainly bring you Peace:* For not only a good Conſcience, but a quiet Conſcience is to be valu'd above Gain. Therefore in matters of Duty do the moſt; in matters of Privilege and Diviſions of Right, and Proportions of Gain (where there is any doubt) chuſe the leaſt, for this is always ſafe.

Thus I have laid down the *Rule*, and explain'd it, and have given as particular Directions as I could ſafely adventure to do: I muſt now leave it to every Man to apply it more particularly to himſelf, and to deal faithfully with his own Conſcience in the uſe of it. Circumſtances which vary Caſes are infinite; therefore when all is done, much muſt be left to the Equity and Chancery of our own Breaſts. I have not told you how much in the Pound you may gain, and no more, nor can I: A Man may make a greater gain at one time than another, of the ſame thing; he may take thoſe Advantages which the Change of Things and the Providence of God gives him, uſing them moderately: A Man may take more of ſome Perſons than of others; provided a Man uſe all Men righteouſly, he may uſe ſome favourably. But I have on purpoſe forborn to deſcend to too many Particularitys: among other reaſons, for the ſake of Sir *Thomas More*'s Obſervation concerning the Caſuiſts of his time, who (he ſaith) by their too particular Reſolutions of Caſes, did not teach

Men *non peccare, not to ſin*, but did ſhew them *quam prope ad peccatum liceat accedere ſine peccato, how near Men might come to ſin, and yet not ſin.*

The Uſes I ſhall make of all this, are theſe two:

USE 1.

Let us not revenge our ſelves: The Rule is not, we ſhould do to others as they do to us, but as we would have them to do to us: as if it were on purpoſe to prevent Revenge. St. *Luke* forbids Revenge from this Rule, *Luke* 6. 31, 32. *For if ye love them that love you*, &c. but love your Enemys. Revenge is the greateſt Offence againſt this Rule: for he that revengeth an Injury hath receiv'd one; he that has receiv'd one, knows beſt what that is which he would not have another to do to him. The nature of Evil and Injury is better known to the Patient than to the Agent: Men know better what they ſuffer, than what they do; he that is injur'd, feels it, and knows how grievous it is; and will he do that to another?

USE 2.

Let me preſs this Rule upon you: Live by it; in all your Carriage and Dealings with Men, let it be preſent to you. Ask your ſelves upon every occaſion, Would I that another ſhould deal thus with me, and carry himſelf thus towards me? But I ſhall preſs this chiefly as to Juſtice and Righteouſneſs

ouſneſs in our Commerce. It is ſaid that *Severus* * the Emperor caus'd this Rule to be written upon his Palace, and in all publick Places; let it be written upon our Houſes, and Shops, and Exchanges. This Exhortation is not altogether improper for this Auditory: You that frequent theſe Exerciſes, ſeem to have a good ſenſe of that part of Religion which is contain'd in the firſt Table; Do not, by your violations of the ſecond, mar your Obedience to the firſt; Do not prove your ſelves Hypocrites in the firſt Table, by being wicked in the ſecond: Give not the world juſt cauſe to ſay, That you are ungodly, becauſe they find you to be unrighteous; but manifeſt your Love to God whom you have not ſeen, by your Love to your Brother whom you have ſeen; and if any Man wrong his Brother, he cannot love him. Do not reject or deſpiſe this Exhortation, under the contemptuous name of *Morality*. Our Saviour tells us, this is a chief part of that which hath ever been accounted Religion in the World, *It is the Law and the Prophets*; and he by injoining it, hath adopted it into Chriſtianity, and made it Goſpel. We ſhould have an eſpecial Love to this Precept, not only as it is the Dictate of Nature, and the Law of *Moſes*; not only as it is a Jewiſh and Gentile Principle, but as it is of the *Houſhold of Faith*. When the Young-Man told Chriſt, that *he had kept the Commandments from his Youth*,

* *Lampridius.*

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it is ſaid, *Jeſus loved him*; Mark 10. 20, 21. Wherever we have learnt to deſpiſe *Morality*, Jeſus lov'd it. When I read the Heathen Writers, eſpecially *Tully* and *Seneca*, and take notice what Precepts of Morality and Laws of Kindneſs are every where in their Writings, I am ready to fall in love with them. How ſhould it make our Blood riſe in many of our Faces who are Chriſtians, to hear with what ſtrictneſs *Tully* * determines Caſes of Conſcience, and how generouſly he ſpeaks of Equity and Juſtice towards all Men? *Societatis arctiſſimum vinculum eſt magis arbitrari eſſe contra naturam, hominem homini detrahere ſui commodi cauſa, quam omnia incommoda ſubire: This is the ſtrongeſt Bond of Society, to account it to be more againſt Nature for any Man to wrong another for his own advantage, than to undergo the greateſt Inconveniences.* And again; *Non enim mihi eſt vita mea utilior, quam animi talis affectus neminem, ut violem commodi mei gratia: Nor is my Life more dear and profitable to me, than ſuch a Temper and Diſpoſition of Mind, as that I would not wrong any Man for my own advantage.* Again, *Tollendum eſt in rebus contrahendis omne mendacium: No kind of Lying muſt be uſed in bargaining.* And to mention no more; *Nec ut emat melius, nec ut vendat quicquam, ſimulabit aut diſſimulabit vir bonus: A good Man will not counterfeit or conceal any thing, that he may buy the cheaper, or ſell the dearer.* And yet further

* *Offic. lib.* 3.

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to check our Proneneſs to deſpiſe moral Righteouſneſs, I cannot but mention an excellent Paſſage to this purpoſe, which I have met with in a learned Man * of our own Nation: *Two things* (ſaith he) *make up a Chriſtian, a true Faith and an honeſt Converſation; and tho the former uſually gives us the Title, the latter is the ſurer: for true Profeſſion without an honeſt Converſation, not only ſaves not, but increaſeth our Weight of Puniſhment; but a good Life without true Profeſſion, tho it brings us not to Heaven, yet it leſſens the meaſure of our Judgment: ſo that a Moral Man, ſo call'd, is a Chriſtian by the ſurer ſide.* And afterwards: *I confeſs* (ſaith he) *I have not yet made that proficiency in the Schools of our Age, as that I could ſee why the ſecond Table, and the Acts of it, are not as properly the parts of Religion and Chriſtianity, as the Acts and Obſervation of the firſt. If I miſtake, then it is St.* James *that hath abus'd me; for he deſcribing Religion by its proper Acts, tells us, That pure Religion, and undefil'd before God and the Father is this, to viſit the Fatherleſs and Widows in their Affliction, and to keep himſelf unſpotted from the World: So that that thing which in an eſpecial refin'd Dialect of the new Chriſtian Language, ſignifys nothing but Morality and Civility, that in the Language of the Holy Ghoſt imports true Religion.* Mark 12. 33, 34. When the Scribe told Chriſt, that *to love God with all the Heart,* &c. *and our Neighbour as our ſelves,*

* *Mr.* Hales.

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was more than whole Burnt-Offerings and Sacrifices; it is ſaid, *When Jeſus ſaw that he anſwer'd diſcreetly, he ſaid unto him, Thou art not far from the Kingdom of God.* They that would have a Religion without moral Righteouſneſs, talk indiſcreetly, and are farther from the Kingdom of God than a mere moral Man. If we neglect this part of Religion, we diſparage the Goſpel, and abuſe our Profeſſion; we are but Pretenders to Chriſtianity. *Plutarch* ſpeaks ſomewhere to this purpoſe; He had rather Poſterity ſhould ſay, There was never ſuch a Man as *Plutarch*, than that he was a vicious, or cruel, or unjuſt Man.

I had rather a Man ſhould not call himſelf a Chriſtian, that he ſhould renounce his Title, than that by his Life and Actions he ſhould repreſent Chriſtians to the World as Oppreſſors, as unjuſt and treacherous Dealers. If Men will only uſe Religion to cover their Unrighteouſneſs, I had rather they would put off their Clokes, and be Knaves *in querpo*, that every body may know them, than that they ſhould go like Highway-Men in vizards and diſguiſes, only that they may rob honeſt Men the more ſecurely.

And to move you to the Practice of this Rule, I ſhall only offer to you one Conſideration, but which hath ſo much weight in it, that it may be inſtead of many: *As you deal with others, ſo ye ſhall be dealt with.* With what Meaſure you mete to others, it ſhall be meaſur'd to you; is a proverbial

bial Speech often us'd by our Saviour, and which one time or other you will find to be very ſignificant. God doth many times by his Providence order things ſo, that in this Life mens Unrighteouſneſs returns upon their own heads, and their violent Dealings upon their own pates. There is a Divine *Nemeſis* which brings our Iniquitys upon our ſelves. No man hath any Vice or Humour alone, but it may be match'd in the world, either in its own kind, or in another: If a Man be cruel and inſolent, *a* Bajazet *ſhall meet with a* Tamerlane: if a Man delight to jeer and abuſe others, *no Man hath ſo good a Wit, but another hath as good a Memory*; he will remember it to revenge it. He that makes a Trade of deceiving and cozening others, doth but teach others to cozen him; and there are but few Maſters in any kind, but are outdone by ſome of their Scholars. But however we may eſcape the hands of Men, how ſhall we eſcape our own Conſciences, either Trouble of Conſcience in this Life, or the Worm of Conſcience in the next? How ſhall we eſcape the hands of the living God? How ſhall we eſcape the Damnation of Hell? 1 Theſſ. 4. 6. *Let no Man go beyond, or defraud his Brother in any matter, for God is the Avenger of all ſuch.* He will take their Cauſe into his own hands, and render to us according to our cruel and fraudulent dealing with others: Mat. 18. 35. *So likewiſe ſhall my Heavenly Father do alſo unto you*, &c. What

our Saviour ſaith, *Mat.* 19. 29. That there is no man that denys himſelf in Houſes or Lands, *&c.* for Chriſt's ſake and the Goſpel's, but ſhall receive in this Life a hundred fold, and in the World to come everlaſting Life; is true alſo here: There is no Man that is injurious to his Brother, in Houſes, or Lands, or good Name, or any other thing, but ſhall probably receive in this World a hundred fold; however (without Repentance) in the World to come everlaſting Miſery. In the next World Men will find, that they have but impoveriſh'd themſelves by their ill-gotten Wealth, and heap'd up for themſelves Treaſures of Wrath: Read thoſe words, and tremble at them, *Jam.* 5. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. *Go to now ye Rich Men, weep and howl, for your Miſery ſhall come upon you,* &c.

Let us then be perſuaded, as we love God whom we have not ſeen, as we love the Goſpel which we read and hear every day, and would preſerve the Reputation of it; as we would better the World, and the Condition of Mankind; as we love our ſelves, and our own Peace and Happineſs; to deal juſtly and equally with all Men. Till we come to live by this Rule of Equity, we can never hope to ſee the World a quiet Habitation. But if this were practis'd among us, then *Glory would dwell in our Land, Mercy and Truth would meet together, Righteouſneſs and Peace would kiſs each other; Truth would ſpring out of the Earth, and Righteouſneſs would look down*

Pſal. 85. 9, 10, &c.

down from Heaven: yea, the Lord would give that which is good, and our Land would yield her Increase; Righteousness would go before him, and set us in the way of his steps.

FINIS.